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AFIT/GEM/ENV/07D-01 
Abstract 
 
 Change orders are used by project managers of construction projects to account 
for unexpected changes in construction projects after the contract has been finalized.  
This can include everything from weather events to last minute changes requested by the 
user.  This effort analyzed data from the U.S. Air Force Military Construction (MILCON) 
program to find the major causes of change orders in the hopes that the associated costs 
may be minimized and that the insight gained may improve project management efforts.  
The data was analyzed using means comparison testing through the nonparametric 
Kruskal-Wallis test; the results were then ranked using the Dunn-Bonferroni method. 
 The results show that pre-construction activities (unforeseen site conditions, 
unforeseen environmental site conditions, user changes, and design deficiencies) are the 
most common causes of change orders for MILCON projects, which agrees with other 
construction research reported in the literature.  Although the information contained in 
the military database was insufficient to determine a conclusive statistical ranking, there 
is evidence that suggests Air Force Material Command may have higher median change 
order cost and Air Combat Command has lower median change order costs.  When 
considering the construction agent, the Air Force seems to have higher median change 
order costs than both the Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities Command.  
However, no specific reasons can be attributed to these observations.  Furthermore, given 
the accuracy and completeness of the data, these results remain questionable and require 
further research to validate. 
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CHARACTERIZING PATTERNS OF  
MILCON PROJECT CONTRACT MODIFICATIONS 
 
Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
Within the strict confines of budget, a diverse and broad cast of conflicting 
players, and pressures from project requirements, project managers (PMs) must typically 
exercise all the tools they have to successfully complete a project.  The construction 
contract modification, also referred to as a change order or “mod,” is a vital tool used by 
PMs to address changes in construction projects after a contract has been finalized.  In 
fact, the change order is one of the few tools the PM has to accommodate for unplanned 
occurrences once the project is under construction.  Therefore, having a better 
understanding of the causes of change that occur during construction may have a 
significant impact on the PM’s ability to manage a project.  Consequently, this research 
effort attempted to identify the major causes contributing to change orders and quantify 
their effects.  The results provide PMs a list of red flags alerting them to potential 
problems and enable them to develop management strategies to minimize overall costs.  
 
General Background  
Simply stated, a change order is a modification of an existing construction 
contract, which is a binding legal agreement between the contractor and the purchaser 
that, among other things such as specifying design and materials, details the agreed upon 
cost and schedule for a project.  Any changes to the contract after it has been agreed upon 
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must be negotiated between the contractor and purchaser as a change to the contract using 
a change order.  As broadly defined above, these terms are industry standards and have 
been defined similarly in many studies (Choy and Sidwall, 1991; Gunhan, Arditi, and 
Doyle, 2007; Hanna, Russell, and Thomack, 1998).  
The negotiation of a change is the change order process and often involves 
changes in the amount of the total cost of the building.  Many change orders are as simple 
as altering the colors or architectural details.  If done early in the project, they usually 
have no direct impact.   However, other change orders have a more direct impact on the 
project.  Events such as major changes to the design, inclement weather, and design 
errors are all examples of change orders with direct impact.  These types of change orders 
can incur significant additional costs and delays to the original schedule.     
Change orders may impact projects indirectly as well.  One study found that the 
average decrease in efficiency of work is 30% while the change work is being performed 
(Thomas and Napolitan, 1995).  In the worst case, excessive amounts of change orders 
may lead to breach or abandonment of the contract (Richey and Walulik, 2001).  
Research has also shown that as the amount of change increases on a project, overall 
productivity decreases; this represents a source of cost escalation and schedule delay 
(Hanna, Camlic, Peterson, and Nordheim, 2002; Ibbs, 1997; Leonard, 1987; Vandenberg, 
1996). 
While change orders may bring increased cost, schedule delay, and indirect costs 
through lost productivity, they are considered inevitable (Cox, 1997).  In fact, change 
orders give the PM a vehicle by which to maintain project momentum (Ehrenreich-
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Hansen, 1994).   “It is a common perception that change orders are undesirable and that 
their number should be as close to zero as possible.  Actually, [change orders] are a very 
necessary and useful tool in quality and risk management of projects” (Ehrenreich-
Hansen, 1994).   Industry has recognized that management of change orders is clearly a 
crucial element of any project.  Project managers must be able to effectively deal with 
change and manage their impact (Cox, 1997).  The focus of this research, understanding 
the potential causes and impact of change orders, provides critical insight regarding 
effective management strategies.  
 
Specific Background 
The United States (U.S.) Air Force executes a very large construction program 
each year.  In 2006, the Air Force Military Construction (MILCON) budget was $1.28 
billion (Dodge, 2006).  Of that amount, $64 million (approximately 5%) was set aside as 
contingency funding for change orders on MILCON projects (AFCEE, 2000).  As 
previously asserted, change orders are inevitable and the Air Force has recognized this by 
establishing these contingency funds.  Furthermore, Air Force PM guidance lists change 
orders as a vehicle by which a PM can accommodate for discrepancies in the plans and 
specifications, changes requested by owners/users who have altered the project goal in 
some way, or simply things that could not be foreseen (AFCEE, 2000).    
However, research has shown that funding change orders at the current 5% level 
is likely to be inadequate (Cook, 2006).  This indicates that budget controls may not be 
addressing spending in a manner consistent with current practice.  For instance, Cook 
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(2006) found that the $64 million set aside as contingency funding only covered about 
half the predicted change order costs.  Therefore, it is critical that change order (i.e., 
contingency) budgets are effectively managed.  Knowing the most common causes of 
change orders gives a PM the ability to scrutinize a project prior to contract award, 
thereby helping him or her avoid pitfalls that may have plagued past projects.  Presently, 
however, the PM has no source for this information.   
When a user, key player, or contractor submits a request for a change order, the 
PM is typically the first person to review that request.  Although many change order 
requests must be forwarded to and approved by other key players, the PM may be able to 
give unofficial approval or disapproval.  In other words, PMs control change orders by 
acting as the first filter and at times the decision maker when a change arises.  However, 
there is very little official guidance provided to Air Force PMs (Arin, 1989).  
Compounding the problem, external elements like available funding often take 
precedence over other factors (Arin, 1989; AFCEE, 2000).  Therefore, any information 
that helps a PM control costs will result in a more successful project.  An understanding 
of the common causes and impacts of change orders is essential so the PM can make wise 
decisions as he or she approaches a project.  Additionally, this understanding will give 
the PM the ability to convey the consequences of the change to decision makers and other 
key players.   
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Problem Statement  
 Given that change order budgets are potentially under-funded, it is imperative that 
existing funds are managed in the most efficient manner possible.  Presently, information 
regarding change order causes and impact across the Air Force does not appear to exist.  
This is reinforced in the Air Force Project Manager’s Guide, which states, “It takes 
experience and a gut feel to be a good project manager” (AFCEE, 2000).  Therefore, 
change order causal and impact information in a digestible format would serve as an 
inexpensive and valuable means by which PMs could build on the past experience of the 
Air Force.  Increasing PM experience would aid in maximizing the efficiency with which 
contingency budgets are spent. 
 
Research Questions  
 This research contributes to the body of knowledge required to answer the 
overarching question, “What can be done to maximize the value of MILCON project 
funding?”  Specifically, this effort answers the question, “What are the causes of change 
orders within the Air Force MILCON program?”  Additionally, this research ranks causes 
of change orders by their magnitude of impact.  Finally, the question, “What does the Air 
Force presently do to capture and preserve experience gained through executing change 
orders in the past?” is also answered.   
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Methodology  
 This research effort collected archived data by gathering project information from 
MILCON program managers and querying an existing Air Force database containing 
information on MILCON projects.  Program managers were asked for electronic copies 
of contractual documents for projects completed from the year 2002 through 2006.  The 
Air Force database containing MILCON information was queried for completed project 
information from the years 2000 through 2004.  Using a small sample of the collected 
project data and information gathered during the literature review (Chapter 2), a list of 
potential change order causes was developed.  The project data gathered from the 
program managers and the database was then categorized by potential change order 
causal factor.  The results were analyzed using the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test and 
those results were ranked using the Dunn-Bonferroni method.  The results drawn from 
those tests are presented in Chapter 4 and final conclusions are presented in Chapter 5. 
 
Assumptions and Limitations  
Because the requested data was recorded during project execution by PMs and 
contracting officers, it was assumed to be recorded correctly.  Therefore, no effort was 
made to verify the accuracy of the data.  It was also assumed that the data consisted of 
projects that were independent of one another and that change orders on one project did 
not affect change orders on another project.  It was also assumed that the submitted 
projects were representative of the Air Force MILCON program as a whole because of 
the broad variety of projects executed in a large number of different locations. 
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The primary limitations of this research effort were the quantity and quality of 
submitted data.  Additionally, there was an inherent reliance upon data that was not 
standardized.  Because there is not a list of standard change order causes that Air Force 
PMs are required to use, assigning a change order causal factor required a subjective 
grading.  This grading process introduces the possibility for personal bias; however, a 
protocol was established early in the effort to minimize any effect of bias.  This is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
Overview of Remaining Chapters 
 The remaining chapters of this thesis present the literature review and results of 
this research effort.  Chapter 2 presents the current status of research regarding change 
orders in the construction industry.  It covers the industry as a whole and narrows to the 
government sector.  Chapter 3 presents the methodology used to complete this research, 
highlighting the gathering of data, the protocol used to prevent bias, and the statistical 
tools used to evaluate the data.  Finally, Chapter 4 provides the results and Chapter 5 
summarizes the effort with a conclusion and recommendations. 
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Chapter 2.  Literature Review 
 
 This chapter reviews the state of existing research completed on change orders as 
they relate to the present research effort.  The chapter begins with a short background 
section that introduces the concept of what constitutes change and a change order.  This is 
followed by a review of research investigating the potential impacts of change on a 
project.  The chapter then covers existing studies germane to the present effort, beginning 
with the construction industry as a whole and narrowing to work specific to the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  Finally, the reviewed literature is synthesized into a 
presentation of common causal factors of change orders, closing with a brief discussion 
of key causal factors identified in this review. 
 
Background 
 It is recognized universally throughout the construction industry that projects will 
experience some degree of change.  This is evidenced by the inclusion of contract 
provisions providing for change, called change clauses, in most construction contracts 
(Richey and Walulik, 2001; FAR, 2005; Cox, 1997).  Understanding what constitutes 
change during a construction contract is necessary prior to being able to study the causes 
of change and hence change orders. 
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Types of Change – Legal Definitions 
Litigation and contract law have defined several different types of change that 
may occur between the parties of a construction contract.  There are generally three types 
of change that may occur:  formal changes, constructive changes, and cardinal changes 
(Cox, 1997).  Formal changes, also called change orders, are those in which the 
contractor is given documentation from the other party (often called the owner) directing 
some change to the original contract documents (Cox, 1997).  It is this type of change 
that is the subject of the current research.  Constructive changes are changes to the work 
that the contractor must make as the result of an action by the owner.  Examples of this 
are errors in the contract documents provided to the contractor at the beginning of the 
project or changes to the work directed by the owner outside the formal processes 
provided for within the original contract (Cox, 1997).  Constructive changes can and 
often do become formal change orders.  Finally, a cardinal change is a change in the 
scope of the agreed upon work of the project (Cox, 1997).  This type of change is akin to 
contracting for an apple and then directing the contractor to provide an orange.  A 
cardinal change may consist of one change or the cumulative effect of numerous changes 
and is typically determined by the courts.  If a cardinal change has occurred, costs are 
awarded or assessed to each party by the legal system (Cox, 1997; Richey and Walulik, 
2001). 
What is a Change Order? – Working Definition 
 While the legal system has clearly defined what a change order is, the term is 
rather generic within the construction industry.  The R.S. Means Construction Dictionary 
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(2003) defines a change order as simply a modification to the original contract documents 
(plans, specifications etc.) formally given to the contractor in writing.  Researchers have 
referred to a number of textbooks, educational materials, or government regulations, and 
arrived at similar definitions (Chan and Yeong, 1995; Günhan et al., 2007).  Others have 
noted that change orders are not always formal documents and include formal and 
constructive changes (e.g., Hanna et al., 1998).  Choy and Sidewell (1991) avoid the term 
altogether and refer to the general term, contract variations, in their effort to document 
the causes of change orders.  The regulations governing acquisition within the federal 
government define a change order as, “a written order, signed by the contracting officer, 
directing the contractor to make a change that the changes clause authorizes the 
contracting officer to order without the contractor’s consent” (FAR, 2005).  
The definition provided by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) 
encompasses the critical elements of the definition of a formal change generally used by 
industry as described by Choy and Sidwell (1991); Chan and Yeong (1995); Cox (1997); 
Hanna et al. (1998);  Richey and Walulik (2001); and Günhan, Arditi, and Doyle (2007).  
The current research effort utilizes the FAR definition since data was collected from a 
federal source.  It is through this lens that the works presented here have been evaluated.  
Chow and Sidwell’s (1991) definition of variation infers that the causes of change orders 
cannot be separated from the causes of the impacts of change orders.  Experience 
supports this, particularly in federal construction.  The impacts of change orders 
discussed here typically include lost productivity on the jobsite, cost overruns, and delay.  
On federal projects, each of those things must be accounted for through the use of a 
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change order (FAR, 2005).  The causes of both change orders and the impacts of change 
orders, for the purposes of this study, are thus directly comparable.   
 
Impacts of Change Orders 
 The study of change orders is valuable because it gives project managers and 
other practitioners in the field tools through which they might avoid some of the negative 
impacts associated with change orders.  Change orders can range from having no impact 
on a project to causing the complete abandonment of a project (Richey and Walulik, 
2001).  While the degree of impact caused by change orders can vary, past research has 
demonstrated that the greater number of change orders a project experiences, the greater 
likelihood the project will be impacted in some manner by change, typically cost growth 
or schedule delay (Gunduz and Hanna, 2005; Hanna et al., 2002; Hanna, Russell, 
Nordheim, and Bruggink 1999a; Hanna, Russell, and Vandenberg, 1999b; Vandenberg, 
1996).  Since the literature primarily addresses risk of impact in terms of lost productivity 
and cost overruns, limiting the amount of change orders also limits the amount of risk on 
a project.  The discussion below presents the potential impact of change orders in those 
terms. 
Productivity 
 Leonard (1987) studies the measure of percent change orders (the percentage of 
labor hours spent on change work vs. the labor hours spent on original contract work) 
compared to percent loss of productivity (percent unproductive labor hours vs. labor 
hours spent on original contract work).  His results show “a significant direct correlation 
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between percentage loss of productivity and percentage change orders” (Leonard, 
1987:2).  On a project with a 25% change order rate, electrical/mechanical work 
experienced a 20% loss of productivity and civil/architectural work experienced a 17% 
loss; if the CO rate increased to 50%, respective work types experienced a 31% and 23% 
loss of productivity (Leonard, 1987). 
 Research by Thomas and Napolitan (1995) supported Leonard’s (1987) results.  
They compared the labor hours required to accomplish a specific task during both a 
normal schedule and change work to calculate productivity rates, which were then used to 
calculate performance ratios during normal work and change work.  These ratios were 
divided by one another to calculate efficiency.  Statistical regression was used to test 
significant contributing factors affecting performance ratios for correlation; an analysis of 
variance test was then completed on each factor to show the efficiency impact of each 
factor.  Thomas and Napolitan (1995) concluded that during change work, projects suffer 
an average 30% loss of efficiency and the timing of the change (that later in the project 
the greater impact) plays a crucial role in affecting efficiency.  
Ibbs (1997) expanded upon Thomas and Napolitan’s work using a different 
approach.  Where Thomas and Napolitan (1995) analyzed several crews over two and a 
half years, Ibbs (1997) surveyed a large number of organizations within the industry 
utilizing a standardized questionnaire that he developed with the Construction Industry 
Institute.  He assessed change orders vs. productivity during the design and construction 
phases and found that as change increases on a project, productivity declines.  During the 
design phase, Ibbs (1997) found that for every 10% increase in change, productivity 
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decreased by 2.48%; for every 10% increase in change during construction, there was a 
corresponding 3.44% decrease in productivity.  These results show that change has more 
impact when it occurs during the construction phase of the project (Ibbs, 1997).  This 
supports Thomas and Napolitan’s (1995) finding that change had greater impact the later 
it occurred in a project.   
At the same time Ibbs (1997) was completing his study, Vandenberg (1996) was 
completing his thesis on the impacts of change orders on the efficiency of construction 
labor working on mechanical systems.  Vandenberg’s thesis later served as the 
foundation for his collaboration with Hanna and Russell (1999b).  In their work, Hanna et 
al. (1999b) utilized the total number of direct labor hours minus the original estimate plus 
the change order estimate divided by the total number of direct labor hours.  The 
published results from their work represent further confirmation of the previous 
researchers’ results.  Hanna et al. (1999b) confirmed not only that projects with a higher 
percentage of change are more likely to be impacted by change, but also that projects 
impacted by change are less efficient.  They additionally confirmed the findings that 
change during the latter part of a project has greater impact (Hanna et al., 1999b).   
Hanna et al. (1999a) published an additional study investigating the impact of 
change orders on the efficiency of electrical work.  Using the same method of measuring 
efficiency used by Hanna et al. (1999b), Hanna et al. (1999a) found that as change work 
increases, so does the likelihood of decreases in efficiency.  Additionally, Hanna et al. 
(1999a) further confirmed the works of previous researchers that the later a change 
occurs, the greater its impact will likely be.  One notable difference, however, was that 
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they were able to find statistical evidence that showed the amount of project manager 
experience correlated with the ability to mitigate the impacts of change work (Hanna et 
al., 1999a).  Earlier efforts had been unable to statistically support this (Hanna et al., 
1999b; Vandenberg, 1996). 
 In terms of loss of productivity, research has shown that change causes 
productivity losses.  Research also indicates that the timing of change is important and 
that change later in projects is associated with greater losses of efficiency.  Interestingly, 
research has not shown any improvement in terms of being able to accommodate change 
and maintain efficiency during a project.   
Cost Overruns 
 Many studies have directly or indirectly addressed the impact of change orders in 
terms of cost overruns, also termed cost growth and cost escalation.  As can be seen in 
the “causes of change orders” section of this chapter, change order causes are often 
identified and characterized by cost overrun information.  This is particularly true on 
federal projects because changes in cost must be accounted for through the use of a 
change order (FAR, 2005).  The studies reviewed below offer evidence which 
demonstrates the impact of cost overruns on projects.  
Jahren and Ashe (1990) introduced the term “change order overrun rate” to the 
cost overrun vocabulary, thereby recognizing the inextricable link between cost and 
change.  Analyzing Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC) data from 1,576 projects 
using nonparametric testing, Jahren and Ashe (1990) investigated potential predictors of 
cost overrun and found that large projects are more likely to experience cost overrun rates 
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of 1% to 11% as opposed to smaller ones.  Additionally, they observed that projects with 
initial award amounts less than the government estimate had a higher risk of cost overrun.  
Although the sample size was relatively large, the data did not meet the assumptions 
required for typical statistical measures and nonparametric assessments had to be utilized, 
thus limiting the overall fidelity of potential results (Jahren and Ashe, 1990). 
Burati, Farrington, and Ledbetter (1992) subsequently published a study on 
quality deviations in design and construction.  They surveyed members of the 
Construction Industry Institute (CII) and completed a detailed study of nine projects.  
While the goal was to demonstrate the causes of deviations or project change, they found 
an average 12.4% cost overrun (Burati et al., 1992).  This coincides with the higher end 
of the range presented by Jahren and Ashe (1990).   
Another study addressing cost growth on military projects was completed by 
Barrientez (1995).  Similar to Jahren and Ashe (1990), he studied NAVFAC projects with 
the goal of identifying causes of change orders.  Using a combination of descriptive 
statistics and sensitivity analysis performed on 157 change orders over 58 separate 
contracts, Barrientez (1995) determined an 8.3% cost escalation as the result of change 
orders executed post award.  These results support the findings of Jahren and Ashe 
(1990) and are within the range determined by Burati et al. (1992). 
Cox, Morris, Rogerson, and Jared (1999) approached change orders using the case 
study technique.  This effort studied two construction projects in the United Kingdom in 
detail from contract award to completion, tracking each change.  They found a 5-8% cost 
overrun as a result of change orders (Cox et al., 1999).   
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An oft-cited study of cost overruns in infrastructure projects is Flyvbjerg, Holm, 
and Buhl (2004).  Their study spanned 258 transport infrastructure projects in 20 different 
nations and was the first and largest of its kind when published (Flyvbjerg et al., 2004).  
Using regression and analysis of variance to determine the causes of cost overrun, 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) found that costs typically increase an average 4.64% per year on 
large transportation infrastructure projects as a result of change orders.  On the famous 
“Chunnel” project, this amounted to $1Millon/day (Flyvbjerg et al., 2004). 
Hsieh, Lu, and Wu (2004) studied 90 public works projects in Taiwan.  They 
found that most change orders resulted from problems in planning and design and 
contributed between 10-17% to project cost; they also presented a well-founded argument 
to incorporate change management into the overall project management plan (Hsieh et 
al., 2004).  Their results are in concert with the findings of Jahren and Ashe (1990), 
Burati et al. (1992), and within the range reported by Barrientez (1995). 
Odeck (2004) used regression analysis of data from the Norwegian Public Roads 
Administration to build and test a model that will predict cost overruns based on a variety 
of factors he found to be significant contributors.  He found a mean cost overrun of 7.9% 
and that cost overruns were more likely to occur in smaller projects as opposed to larger 
ones (Odeck, 2004).  This is a departure from Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) which found the 
likelihood of cost escalation to be high for all sizes of transportation projects.   Odeck’s 
results support the finding of the previous researchers. 
 Nassar, Nassar, and Hegab (2005) focused on paving projects completed by the 
Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT).  Working in a vein similar to Odeck 
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(2004), they utilized data from 219 IDOT projects to develop a frequency distribution of 
the causes and effects of cost overrun.  This effort reported an overall average cost 
overrun of 4%.  While this value is low, it is within the range found by Jahren and Ashe 
(1990).  It should be noted though that Nassar et al. (2005) focused solely on asphalt 
paving projects as opposed to other efforts which included multiple types of construction. 
Dantata, Touran, and Schneck (2006) completed an interesting study in cost 
overrun comparison.  They compared the cost overruns on light rail projects from 1994 to 
2004 with those of an earlier study that investigated projects from 1984 to 1990.  Dantata 
et al. (2006) tested the means of the year groups using a t-test to determine if there were 
any differences.  While the results were not conclusive, they did indicate that cost 
overruns in light rail construction did seem to be decreasing (Dantata et al., 2006).  Their 
research is unique because it is the only effort that seems to suggest a gradual decreasing 
trend in cost overruns. 
Cook’s work (2006) was the most recent study to address cost escalation within 
the DoD, and specifically the Air Force.  Cook analyzed a large database of Military 
Construction (MILCON) projects to develop and test a predictive model of cost overruns.  
The study found that the typical project experienced a cost overrun of 11.6% (Cook, 
2006), which is in concert with the results of previous researchers cited in this section. 
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) recently completed studies on both 
courthouse construction and major construction within the Department of Energy (DOE).  
Cost growth in these programs was observed to be 5% and 50%, respectively (GAO, 
2005; GAO, 2007).  Another study completed by the GAO on the Federal Highway 
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Administration in 1997 reported that 23 of 30 projects reviewed had experienced cost 
growth and that half of those had growth greater than 25% (GAO, 1997). 
Günhan et al. (2007) work on public school construction is another source of data 
regarding the impact of change orders in terms of cost overrun.  They tracked the annual 
cost overrun of a school district as the ratio of change order value to contract value.  
Günhan et al. (2007) cite overruns ranging from as high as 12% to as low as 2.5%, with 
an average of roughly 5%.  Again, these results coincide with those already presented. 
Summation 
With reported cost overrun results ranging from 1% to 25%, a cost overrun of 
10% to 15% in not unrealistic.  Coupling these results with the consideration of the 
established losses of productivity that also occur due to change work, it seems as though 
addressing the causes of change orders can potentially provide valuable project savings.  
These savings can be realized both in terms of actual project cost and intangible costs 
associated with improved productivity. 
  
The Causes of Change Orders 
 A number of studies investigating the causes of change orders have been 
completed in recent years.  These studies cover everything from large infrastructure 
projects in metropolitan locations to small irrigation projects in less developed countries.  
They take varied approaches.  Some are completed via survey of industry professionals, 
others using public data, still others are case studies of specific types of projects such as 
public school construction.  Presented first are general industry studies followed by 
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studies completed on behalf of or completed using data provided by the DoD.  The 
culmination of these efforts provides common sources of cost overruns and avenues of 
potential investigation.  This section concludes with a summation of change order causes 
as documented by industry research. 
 Industry Studies 
Among published works in North America, Diekmann and Nelson (1984) stands 
out.  Frequently cited both domestically and abroad, this effort represented a shift in 
industry focus on change order causes by using descriptive statistics to show a new 
direction in research was needed; much of the literature until that time focused on other 
causes of change such as differing site conditions, mismanagement, and delay.  
Diekmann and Nelson (1984) analyzed 22 federally administered projects and found that 
72% of change order causes originated from design error and user changes.  Differing site 
conditions accounted for 15% of claims while weather, labor strikes, and other causes 
accounted for the remainder (Diekmann and Nelson, 1984).  Although the results were 
purely descriptive and did not include any statistical analysis, the research changed the 
focus of study within the industry. 
 Arditi, Akan, and Gurdamar (1985) blazed an early path in studying the causes of 
change orders with their benchmark effort studying public sector projects in Turkey.  
Alarmed by an average 30% cost increase on school and hospital construction, they 
surveyed contractors and public servants to collect data on 384 different projects 
completed from 1970 to 1980.  The research effort was challenged by high inflation 
during the study period and the researchers suspected that data reported on the public 
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projects were possibly handpicked to represent the best cases.  Arditi et al. (1985) found 
four primary reasons for cost overruns.  Presented in order of importance by relative 
weight, the reasons for cost overruns in Turkey from 1970 to 1980 were:  inflation and 
economic circumstances of the nation, government policy, resource shortages, and 
inaccurate estimates of project cost due to incomplete plans and specifications at critical 
moments during project timelines.  Juxtaposed against Diekmann and Nelson (1984), it is 
clear that economic and societal conditions external to projects make it difficult to 
compare the efforts to one another.  It is that much more noteworthy that both efforts cite 
design issues as a contributing factor. 
 Foundational efforts regarding changes orders and construction productivity 
include many of the researchers cited earlier in this chapter.  Leonard’s (1987, 1988) 
work represented a great stride forward as he was among the first to use field 
investigation as opposed to survey work.  Partnering with a professional construction 
management firm, he investigated 57 different projects that had high levels of change to 
examine the causes of change orders and how change orders contributed to productivity 
loss (Leonard, 1988).  Using descriptive statistics, Leonard (1987) found that 65% of 
change orders were caused by design errors and omissions and 35% were caused by 
design changes (requested by either the user or the A/E).  Leonard (1987) further 
developed standard productivity curves to estimate loss for specific types of work, 
estimating productivity losses as high as 50% in some cases.  The principal finding of his 
work is that the majority of changes orders are caused by either design errors and 
omissions or owner and A/E changes (Leonard, 1988). 
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Dlakwa and Culpin (1990) followed the methodology used by Arditi et al. (1985) 
to investigate work in Nigeria by surveying industry professionals.  Where Arditi et al. 
(1985) included only public agencies and contractors, Dlakwa and Culpin (1990) cast a 
broader net to include other professionals such as architects, engineers, and consultants.  
Similar to Arditi et al. (1985), Dlakwa and Culpin (1990) found that economic and 
political circumstances were the primary factor in cost overruns, followed by construction 
delays (caused by resource shortages), inadequate planning, and deficiencies in initial 
estimates.  Both studies seem to indicate that in less developed countries geo-economics 
may play a larger role in cost overruns than local factors. 
 Choy and Sidwell (1991) published an oft-quoted work on variation in Australian 
construction contracts.  A number of studies cite their definition of variation, including 
the works of both Alwi (2003) and Chan and Yeong (1995).  Choy and Sidwell (1991) 
used a survey and descriptive analysis of 32 case studies collected from industry to find 
that two major sources (design document deficiencies and user requested changes) 
accounted for 76% of change on the subject projects. 
Burati et al. (1992) subsequently published his study on quality deviations in 
design and construction and not only confirmed Leonard’s (1987, 1988) findings but 
expanded upon them.  Burati et al. (1992) also reported that design errors and omissions 
constituted 78% of total deviations and 79% of total overrun cost.  Construction changes 
and errors comprised another 16% of total deviations and the remaining 6% was 
distributed among other factors. 
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Assaf, Al-Khalil, and Al-Hazmi (1995) expanded survey techniques for changes 
and performed an analysis of schedule delay.  They focused on contractors, owners, and 
A/E firms as opposed to Choy and Sidwell’s (1991) focus on contractors.  Assaf et al. 
(1995) surveyed 48 construction professionals in Saudi Arabia and assessed their 
opinions for cause of delay using a standardized questionnaire.  Using inferential 
statistics to perform an analysis of weighted rankings, they found that contractors, 
owners, and A/Es generally agree on the causes of change orders.  However, when 
measured specifically, A/Es and contractors tend to agree with each other and owners 
tend to agree with neither party (Assaf et al., 1995).  The analysis also showed that the 
leading causes of change were financing, requests by owners for special materials, lack of 
manpower (resources), owner changes, design errors, and the relationships between the 
parties as the top causes of delay (Assaf et al., 1995).  As Dlakwa and Culpin (1990) 
found, the general economic and political circumstances of a location play an important 
role in project cost.  The findings of Assaf et al. (1995) are interesting because they 
represent the inklings of a bridge between studies completed in less developed countries 
and the modern world, specifically Arditi et al. (1985) and Dlakwa and Culpin (1990).  
Assaf et al. (1995) focused on the same change causes that researchers in North America 
and Europe focused on prior to Diekmann and Nelson’s (1984) effort.      
 Previously cited in the cost overrun section of this chapter, Cox et al. (1999) used 
the case study technique to examine projects from start to completion.  They found the 
most common reasons for change orders were errors and omissions in the design 
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documents, user changes, and unforeseen site conditions (Cox, et al., 1999).  This is 
consistent with the work of previously cited researchers.  
 Love and Li (2000) approached the causes and costs of rework in much the same 
manner as Cox et al. (1999) approached change orders.  They used the case study 
technique to address rework as a measure of quality on Australian projects and found that 
the major causes of rework in both subject projects were errors and omissions in design 
documents and user changes (Love and Li, 2000).  While change orders and rework are 
not always directly comparable, the two major causes of rework (design errors and 
omissions and user changers) identified by Love and Li (2000) parallel similar causes of 
change orders identified by other studies (e.g., Diekmann and Nelson, 1984; Leonard, 
1987, 1988; Choy and Sidwell, 1991; Burati et al., 1992; Cox et al., 1999). 
 Al-Momani (2000) expanded the work of Assaf et al. (1995) regarding the causes 
of schedule delay.  He surveyed 130 projects in Jordan considered to have unsatisfactory 
performance and found the two most significant causes of delay to be poor design and 
change orders; these were followed by weather, unforeseen site conditions, resource 
shortages (late delivery), and economic conditions (Al-Momani, 2000).  He confirmed 
the validity of his results with regression models accounting for approximately two-thirds 
of total variation.   
Hanna et al. (2002) authored a study using the same measure of efficiency used 
by previous efforts to develop a predictive model of change order impact to a project 
(Hanna et al., 1999a,b; Vandenberg, 1996).  Their research effort yielded several factors 
that serve as predictors of potential impact to projects by affecting productivity (Hanna et 
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al., 2002).  Of significance, they found that projects not impacted by change orders had a 
lower percentage of change orders due to design errors and omissions.  Additional factors 
that could potentially impact productivity were schedule compression (through the use of 
overtime and over manning), the amount of change, absenteeism and turnover, manpower 
increase over planned levels, and the processing time from the initiation to approval of a 
change order (Hanna et al., 2002). 
Alwi (2003) measured productivity by surveying Indonesian contractors and 
analyzed their results with respect to 53 different variables derived from a literature 
review.  These variables were classified as waste categories or waste causes and a survey 
was developed to test these variables.  The results were analyzed using a weighted score 
model and key variables were identified and then ranked using statistical testing.  Alwi 
(2003) described the causes of productivity loss in order of significance as: design 
changes, labor issues, and poor management.    
A more recent effort to document delay and cost overruns in less developed 
regions of the world was completed by Frimprong and Oluwoye (2003).  The study 
focused on water projects in Ghana and was based in large part on the works of Arditi et 
al. (1985), Dlakwa and Culpin (1990), Assaf et al. (1995), and Al-Momani (2000).  
Utilizing a methodology similar to Assaf et al. (1995), they surveyed contractors, owners, 
and consultants and used a similar statistical method to analyze the data.  Similar to Assaf 
et al. (1995), Frimprong and Oluwoye (2003) found financing, economic conditions, 
natural conditions, and materials (resources) to be the top four causes. 
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 In addition to the cost overrun findings previously cited in this chapter, Hsieh et 
al. (2004) developed a list of change order causes based on a literature review and 
investigated 90 public works projects in Taiwan.  They first classified change orders into 
categories and then analyzed projects by cost variance, schedule variance, frequency of 
change orders, the total addition and subtraction due to change on a project, the 
proportion of change on a project, and the contribution of change to a project.  Using 
analysis of variance to test the proportion and degree of change of each change category, 
they found that most change orders arose from problems in planning and design (Hsieh et 
al., 2004). 
 A pair of studies completed by Wu, Hsieh, and Cheng (2004) and Wu, Hsieh, 
Cheng, and Lu (2005) was based on a case study analysis of over 1,000 change orders on 
the Second National Highway project in Taiwan.  Both studies cited a combination of 
geological conditions and thoroughness of geologic survey during design as a primary 
cause for most change orders (Wu et al., 2004, 2005).  Wu et al. (2005) concluded, “In 
the life cycle of construction engineering, the ratio on [sic] the cost of planning and 
design is low, but its influence to the entire engineering is the largest of all.”  These 
results support the general theme of the previously cited research that design errors and 
omissions are a leading cause of change orders and project change.  
 Georgy, Chang, and Zhang (2005) conducted research on the narrow sector of 
industrial construction performance.  They developed a questionnaire to measure 
engineering performance in the industrial construction sector and surveyed 22 contractors 
(Georgy et al., 2005).  The data was analyzed using a variety of descriptive statistics and 
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efficiency measures developed by the authors.  They found the primary causes of rework 
to be design error (33%), vendor error (23%), and owner changes (20%) (Georgy et al., 
2005).  This analysis contributes additional weight to the overall trend recognizing design 
errors and omissions as leading causes of change orders. 
 Gunduz and Hanna (2005) used the same method that Hanna et al. (2002) used to 
calculate productivity in Hanna’s earlier studies (1999a,b).  However, they expanded the 
detail of the previous studies by characterizing results by project size.  While specific 
results are difficult to generalize across the three classifications of small, medium, and 
large, Gunduz and Hanna (2005) indicated that pre-construction activities and the amount 
of change generally correlated with negative impacts on productivity.   
 The Nassar et al. (2005) study that focused on asphalt paving documented an 
average 4% cost increase on asphalt projects and reported the primary cost overrun causal 
factors to be unpredictable addition (unforeseen site conditions), differences between the 
planned quantities and final needed quantities, environmental cleanup, and finally design 
errors.  These results are in concert with the other results reviewed so far, finding design 
as a key causal issue of change orders. 
 The final effort reviewed is that of the previously cited effort of Günhan et al. 
(2007) investigating public school construction.  Although design errors were found to be 
a cause of change orders, they were not a consistently high percentage of causes over the 
study period (Günhan et al., 2007).  Günhan et al. (2007) reported unforeseen site 
conditions to be the only consistent source of change orders; owner changes, code 
compliance issues, design errors and omissions, and other changes all fluctuated at 
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varying degrees over the study period.  However, it should be noted that this finding was 
based on data drawn from a single school district. 
Department of Defense 
The specific focus of the current research effort is the analysis of U.S. Air Force 
MILCON projects.  Past studies of MILCON and DoD work are quite comparable and 
provide a good source of historical information with which to compare the results of the 
present effort.   
Rowland (1981), in the first study within the DoD to focus on change order rates, 
studied change orders from the Southern Division of the Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command (NAVFAC).  By analyzing bid data collected from 19 projects using 
descriptive statistics, Rowland (1981) identified three significant results:  change order 
rates increased as bid dispersion increased, change order rates increased as the size of the 
project increased, and change order rates were highest in commercial construction 
(followed by industrial and heavy construction).  Rowland (1981) also highlighted the 
difficulties of studying change orders because of the diversity of unrelated economic 
factors that can affect a project (e.g., inflation, public policy, labor issues).   
 A subsequent Navy study utilized data collected from the Western Division of the 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command.  Rosmond (1984) utilized a broader data set in 
terms of project numbers than the previous work by Rowland (1981); however, both were 
limited to specific geographic regions.  Rosmond (1984) investigated whether or not 
contractors were low-bidding government contracts and attempting to use change orders 
to compensate for low profit margin.  Using regression and analysis of variance 
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(ANOVA), the study tested the correlation of change order rates with a number of 
independent variables.  No single variable, nor any combination of variables, were found 
to account for the change order rates within the Western Division (Rosmond, 1984), 
further demonstrating, as in Rowland’s (1981) study, the complexity of variables 
affecting change rates.  Rosmond (1984) particularly focused on competition measures 
within the bidding environment but also included geographic area, quarter of the fiscal 
year in which the project was awarded, and others.  Interestingly, Cook’s (2006) work 
provided contrasting results, showing both an increase in cost overruns for projects 
awarded in the 4th quarter and a decrease in cost overruns in a highly competitive bid 
environment.  Cook’s (2006) data, however, covers a broad geographic range and the 
spectrum of construction types. 
 A third Navy study completed in 1995 used a different approach.  Instead of 
analyzing data to find trends, Barrientez (1995) identified known causes for change 
orders based on a combination of Navy guidance and industry standards used to 
document changes.  Barrientez (1995) then surveyed 58 completed projects from Corpus 
Christi Naval Air Station to analyze cost and time data to determine the frequency with 
which a predefined set of causes occurred.  A second analysis was performed to 
determine the frequency of known causes within various types of construction work (e.g. 
electrical work, mechanical work, civil work, etc.).  Barrientez (1995) found the 
predominate source of change orders in the majority of construction types was owner 
changes; in projects in which owner changes were not the predominate cause for change 
orders, owner changes were still significant causes.  Barrientez (1995) also found that 
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design errors comprised only 5% of the total cost of change orders.  This represented a 
significant departure from industry research in which design errors and omissions were 
seen as a leading cause of change. 
 Finally, the most recent study to address change orders within the DoD, and 
specifically the Air Force, was Cook’s (2006) work in which he developed a predictive 
model of cost overruns of Air Force projects.  The study found that the typical Air Force 
Military Construction Project (MILCON) experienced a cost overrun of 11.6% (Cook, 
2006). While his research focused on contingency budgets and cost overruns, the change 
order is the primary vehicle by which contingency budgets are expended; therefore, Cook 
(2006) concluded that the cost of change orders is being underestimated. 
Summation 
 Industry research over the last 20 years has established a relatively small set of 
causal factors regarding change orders, with design errors and omissions being the 
leading factors.  However, research on military construction projects has not been as 
definitive.  The next and final section of this chapter identifies the most common change 
orders causes cited by the literature. 
 
Synthesizing Existing Research 
 Because of the extent and breadth of information gathered during the literature 
review, it was necessary to develop a method by which to synthesize a consensus of 
common causal factors regarding change orders.  Each research effort was thus studied 
and the causes of change orders were identified.  Because of the varied nature of the 
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studies and language describing the causes of the change orders, generalized categories 
were developed to accommodate categorization of the causes.  Table 1 reflects the results 
of this process.   
 
Freq. of 
Occurrence   Change Order Causes 
19.32% Design Deficiencies 
12.50% User Changes 
10.23% Unforeseen Site Conditions 
7.95% Unknown, Other 
6.82% Construction Deficiencies 
6.82% Management Problems 
5.68% Weather 
5.68% Economic Conditions 
4.55% Location 
4.55% Location 
3.41% Unforeseen Environmental Site Conditions 
3.41% Safety/Labor Issues 
2.27% Under-Bidding 
2.27% Value Engineering Proposals 
1.14% Project Size 
1.14% Bid Dispersion 
1.14% Project Length 
1.14% Project Complexity 
 
Conclusion 
 Existing literature has clearly demonstrated that change in projects can have a 
negative impact, particularly on direct costs but also indirect costs such as loss of 
productivity.  In general terms, considering the available research, it is not unreasonable 
to fathom an average project direct cost increase of 10%.  The impact on productivity and 
other indirect costs is more difficult to measure but has clearly been documented. 
Table 1.  Change order roll-up. 
 31
Minimizing these impacts is clearly in the best interest of owners, designers, and 
contractors. 
 Addressing these impacts requires an examination of their causes.  A review of 
existing literature clearly indicates a focus on design issues as a primary cause, followed 
by user changes, unforeseen site conditions and a myriad of other causes (see Table 1).  
Fortunately, these causes are perhaps the easiest, least expensive, and most practical to 
address.  The results of this review provide a vector by which to guide the research effort 
of the current study. 
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Chapter 3.  Methodology 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, change orders have a large impact on the annual 
Military Construction (MILCON) program of the United States Air Force.  Existing 
research outlined in Chapter 2 showed the progress past efforts have made in 
investigating the causes of change orders.  This research effort builds on past efforts by 
characterizing and analyzing the nature of change orders on MILCON projects across the 
United States Air Force.  Utilizing existing data collected from Air Force project 
managers, descriptive and inferential statistics were used to gauge the magnitude of 
change orders within the organization and detect trends or patterns of the causes of 
change orders with the hope that this additional insight might help improve project 
management performance. The research methodology consisted of four phases:  data 
collection, initial data analysis, categorization of data, and final data analysis.  Each of 
these phases will be discussed in this chapter. 
 
Data Collection 
In order to characterize MILCON change orders, a large amount of data on 
existing projects, and particularly the change orders affecting them, was required.  The 
objective of this data collection effort was to obtain total project cost, both at the time of 
contract award and at financial close out, and a cause and cost for each project 
modification.  The Air Force records this data primarily in two places:  the project 
manager’s project file and the Air Force’s Automated Civil Engineer System (ACES). 
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Data from within Project Manager’s Files 
Data from the project manager’s files is provided in the form of financial 
documentation of the project award and amendments provided by the contracting 
authority.  Contracting personnel provide MILCON project managers two forms that 
document this information.  The first is Standard Form (SF) 1442 which documents 
contract award information.  The second is the SF 30 which documents any changes to 
the original project.  Surveying these forms, particularly the SF 30, yielded the cost and 
cause of a given change order.  The SF 1442 was necessary because it contains the 
original project data which was also required as part of this effort.  Additionally, the SF 
1442 form contains ancillary data such as location, the government agency overseeing the 
project, the project requester, and other information that may be analyzed for trends not 
directly attributable to a specific cause.   
To collect the necessary data, a request was sent to the major command 
(MAJCOM) MILCON project managers (PMs) through the Installations and Mission 
Support office at Headquarters Air Force to provide the SF 1442 and SF 30s for each 
MILCON project considered financially completed in 2002 through 2006.  The year of 
2002 was chosen because, generally speaking, information for projects after that date is 
stored electronically.  Additionally, because of the way the government contracts and 
pays for projects, MILCON projects are not typically financially completed for a period 
of time after the physical building has been completed during which all required 
paperwork is accomplished.  The requirement for financially completed projects is 
necessary to screen out data that may change in the future.  Although a review of SF 1442 
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and SF 30 forms is the preferred method of collecting data since these forms represent the 
original source, it would require significant efforts that are unlikely to be supported by 
the organizations being tasked to provide the information.  Therefore, collecting the data 
electronically is considered the most practical option. 
Data from within ACES 
The ACES system is a large electronic database utilized by civil engineers to 
document, track, and issue reports on a number of organizational functions.  Since part of 
the system is dedicated to project management, Civil Engineering PMs report project data 
to higher headquarters levels through this system.  Accessing the database is 
accomplished via a request to a central office and the data is provided rapidly at little 
cost.  Using data obtained from this system relies on the assumption that the system was 
regularly and accurately updated.  It also limits the amount of information that a project 
manager can document by setting limits on the size of the field used to describe a change 
order.  This requires the project manager to distill the data from the SF 30 into a 
description that will fit within the space provided by ACES.  This decreases the fidelity 
of the description of change orders. 
 
Initial Data Analysis 
 The purpose of the initial data analysis was to empirically detect common trends 
in the causes of change orders within Air Force MILCON projects.  To effectively do 
this, the change must be carefully attributed to causes that have meaning to the 
organization so that the change (and cause) can be appropriately addressed.  An initial list 
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of common causes was developed from information gathered during the literature review 
in Chapter 2.  Based upon their frequency of observation in previous research, the most 
common change order causal factors identified in Chapter 2 are Design Deficiencies, 
Unforeseen Site Conditions, Unforeseen Environmental Site Conditions, User Changes, 
Unknowns, and Weather.  These causes are defined (see Table 3, Chapter 4) to create a 
standard by which change orders can be judged.  This list was used as the basis for the 
categorization of change order causes.   When less common causes identified during the 
literature or previously encountered causes were identified, new categories were created 
and added to a “watch list.”  The “watch list” served as a place holder for potential cause 
categories that may or may not be meaningful (an example of a meaningless cause would 
be a cause that is observed only a few times out of several thousand data points).  The 
change order causal factor list and the watch list were the vehicles by which the 
categorization of the data took place. 
 
Categorization of Data 
 Once a basic list of change order causes and their definitions were generated, each 
change order was evaluated and assigned to one of the causal factor categories.  During 
this categorization, the geographic location and project name were hidden to guard 
against researcher bias.  As a further measure to prevent bias, the following protocol was 
used to determine the cause of a given change order. 
1. Read change order cause as listed on the SF 30. 
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2. Review the change order causal factor list and determine the appropriate 
category, based on the category definitions, which most closely resembles the 
change order cause from step 1.  If a suitable causal factor is found, assign the 
change order to that category and proceed to step 5; if not, proceed to step 3. 
3. Review the “watch list” and determine the appropriate category, based on the 
category definitions, which most closely resembles the change order cause 
from step 1.  If a suitable causal factor is found, assign the change order to 
that category and proceed to step 5.  If the cause of the change order is not on 
the watch list, add an appropriate category to the list, define it, and proceed to 
step 5; if not, proceed to step 4. 
4. If no cause can be determined from the available information, classify the 
change order as an unknown causal factor and proceed to step 5. 
5. Verify that a causal factor category has been assigned to the change order, 
then repeat the process for the next change order. 
Once a change order was assigned to a causal factor category, it was changed only if 
clear evidence emerged that the initial categorization was incorrect.  
 
Final Data Analysis 
 
 The final data analysis consisted of two steps:  a descriptive characterization of 
the data and a statistical analysis of the data.  The descriptive characterization of the data 
provided quantification of the costs of change in terms of cause.  It also provided an 
anecdotal assessment of how well the Air Force is managing the data in terms of how 
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much data could not be used due to lack of supporting information.  The statistical 
analysis of the data provided an evaluation of the impact of each change order cause and 
a rank-order of the causes in terms of impact to the organization.  Given the data to be 
collected, a single-factor, one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was initially 
selected to evaluate the change order causal factors in terms of standardized cost, which 
was defined as the change order cost as a percentage of the overall project cost.  Utilizing 
this test requires several assumptions be met:  a) the data are independent and random, b) 
the populations have approximately normal distributions, and c) the population variances 
are equal (McClave, Benson, and Sincich, 2005).  However, after an initial review of the 
data, it was determined that the data violated the normality and homogeneity of variance 
assumptions; therefore, the ANOVA test could not be used.   
 Because of the lack of normality and homogeneity of variance, this research used 
the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test, which is a nonparametric median comparison test in which 
that data are either provided in rank order or are rank ordered by the researcher (Sheskin, 
2007).  This test requires that “a) the data has been randomly selected from the 
population, b) the data is independent, c) the dependent variable is continuous, and d) the 
underlying distributions from which the samples are derived are identical in shape” 
(Sheskin, 2007).  The data met these assumptions. 
 The general procedure, as outlined by Sheskin (2007), includes the following 
steps:  rank order the data, adjust rankings for any ties, sum the rankings to determine the 
score per group (i.e., causal factor), and calculate the test statistic.  The null hypothesis 
for the procedure is (Sheskin, 2007):  kH θθ ==K10 : .  In other words, it is 
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hypothesized that the medians of each group are equal.  The alternative hypothesis of the 
test is (Sheskin, 2007):  :1H  Not  0H , which hypothesizes that the medians of at least 
two groups differ.  This is an important point of distinction; while the null hypothesis 
indicates that all groups are equal, the alternative hypothesis does not state that all groups 
differ; the alternative hypothesis states only that at least two differ (Sheskin, 2007).  The 
test-statistic is given by: 
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which calculates a Chi-Square approximation where N is the total number of samples, k is 
the total number of groups (i.e., CO Causal Factors), Rj is the sum of the ranks for each 
group j, and nj is the number of subjects for each group j (Sheskin, 2007). 
Using the appropriate degrees of freedom and the level of significance chosen by 
the researcher, the Chi-square value is calculated or determined from the Chi-square 
distribution table to determine if a significant difference exists among the subject groups 
(Sheskin, 2007).  The present research effort utilized the JMP® statistical analysis 
software package which includes a correction for excessive numbers of ties.  This 
correction also provides a more conservative test of the alternative hypothesis (Sheskin, 
2007).  The correction is based on the number of tied scores that occur within the ranking 
of the data and is given by (Sheskin, 2007): 
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where s is the number of sets of ties, ti is the number of tied scores in the ith set of ties, 
and N is the total number of samples.  The corrected test statistic is given by (Sheskin, 
2007) as:  HC = H/C. 
 Once a statistically significant difference is shown among the change order 
causes, the data is examined to determine if there were differences between pairs of 
causes.  A multiple comparison technique for large sample sizes was applied as first 
described by Dunn (1964) and referenced in both McClave (2005) and Sheskin (2007).  
This technique uses the means of the ranks of each group to calculate the minimum 
required difference required to show that each group is different from one another 
(Sheskin, 2007).  The difference is calculated by (Sheskin, 2007) as: 
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where N is the total number of observations, na and nb are the numbers of observations in 
each group, and zadj is a function of the number of comparisons made and the tolerance 
for error (Sheskin, 2007).  The value for zadj is taken from the normal distribution table 
based on the “per comparison Type I error rate (αPC)” (Sheskin, 2007).  This error rate is 
controlled by the Bonferroni-Dunn method which divides the maximum acceptable error 
by the total number of comparisons:  αPC =.05/c where c is the total number of 
comparisons (Sheskin, 2007).  Using the Bonferroni-Dunn method ensures that the total 
error introduced will not be greater than an overall α value of 0.05. 
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Conclusion 
 The methodology used four processes that collect and analyze data from existing 
sources of U.S. Air Force project managers.  Utilizing this methodology yields an 
assessment of the most common causes of change within Air Force MILCON projects.  
This assessment will show the magnitude of each cause and statistically assess which 
causes have the greatest impact on projects.   Chapter 4 discusses in detail each phase of 
this methodology as implemented.  
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Chapter 4.  Results 
 
 The results of the methodology outlined in Chapter 3 are presented in this chapter.  
Discussed in detail are data collection, initial data analysis, categorization of data, and 
final data analysis.  The chapter concludes with a summary of the results. 
 
Data Collection  
During this portion of the methodology, data was collected from two sources.  
The preferred approach of gathering data directly from the project manager’s files had 
limited success.  This was followed by a subsequent, successful effort to collect data from 
the Automated Civil Engineer System (ACES) database. 
Data from within Project Manager’s Files 
A data request was submitted to Headquarters Air Force, Installations and 
Mission Support Office, tasking Major Command (MAJCOM) Military Construction 
(MILCON) project managers (PMs) to provide electronic copies of standard form (SF) 
1442s and SF 30s of projects financially completed between 2002 and 2006.  After three 
months with no responses, a more targeted approach was used.  A list of 200 projects 
from the ACES database that met the criteria outlined in the original request was 
generated and the request for data was reissued.  The resulting response rate of 16% (see 
Table 2 for responses) was insufficient to meet the research needs. 
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Response Type 
MAJCOM 
Electronic Paper Copy 
Air Combat Command 0 0 
Air Education and Training Command 1 15 
Air Force Material Command 0 0 
Air Force Reserve Command 0 0 
Air Force Space Command 0 0 
Air Force Special Operations Command 3 0 
Air Mobility Command 0 0 
Pacific Air Forces 5 0 
United States Air Forces in Europe 7 0 
Total 16 15 
Total Requested 200  
 
Several key observations were made during this data collection effort.  Despite 
efforts within the Air Force to convert to digitally maintained documents, half of the 
respondents could only respond with paper copies.  When PMs were contacting directly, 
they often stated that either the data was not readily accessible electronically or that they 
simply did not have it.  One program manager stated that it was not policy to maintain the 
requested contractual data within their project files.  Other managers forwarded the data 
request to the construction agent, typically the Army Corps of Engineers (COE).  
However, requiring this data to be made available for future Air Force review is not 
typically stipulated in MILCON project contracts; therefore, the COE representatives 
indicated that they did not have easy access to the data and requested additional funds to 
Table 2.  Data Call Response Rate by MAJCOM 
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pay for the necessary staff work.  While no definitive conclusion can be drawn as to why 
many program managers could not respond, it is clear that the data is not maintained in a 
manner sufficient for easy recall at a later date.   
Data from within ACES 
The low response rate from MAJCOM program managers posed a severe 
problem.  Thirty-one projects did not yield a sufficient sample size from which to draw 
statistical conclusions.  Additionally, the data was concentrated primarily in one 
MAJCOM, Air Education and Training Command (AETC), which would have skewed 
the results.  Therefore, ACES data from Cook’s (2006) prior research effort were used to 
obtain the required project information.  This data consisted of MILCON projects 
financially completed from the years 2000 to 2004; this represented 326 projects with a 
total of 5,286 change orders.  However, many of the ACES data fields were either 
incomplete or contained inconsistencies.  Furthermore, 17% of the change orders lacked 
complete information in the following fields:  Basic Low Bid amount, Change Order 
amount, and Change Order description.  Therefore, only 278 projects, comprising 3,842 
change orders, contained sufficient data.  To avoid stratification between the ACES data 
and the contractual data contained in the SF 1442 and SF 30 forms, the 31 projects 
initially submitted were not used as part of the analysis.   
 
Initial Data Analysis 
 The intent of this phase was to initiate a list of change order causes by which to 
categorize the data.  This initial list is outlined in Table 2 and is comprised of the most 
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frequently observed causes of change orders reported in the literature.  Per the 
methodology, these factors have been subsequently defined to establish standards for 
classification.  Discussed in the next section, an additional list was created of potential 
change order causal factors, which was called the Watch List.   
 
Causal Factor Definition 
Design Deficiencies 
Change orders attributed to mistakes made 
by design engineers and those responsible 
for the review of the designs 
Unforeseen Site Conditions 
Change orders that could not be avoided 
due to hidden problems that could not be 
detected during design 
Unforeseen Environmental Site Conditions 
Change orders due to unknown 
environmental contamination that could not 
be detected during design 
User Changes Change orders initiated by the user after the initial contract had been awarded 
Unknown Causes 
Change orders that contained data in all 
required fields but the data was of 
insufficient quality to determine a cause 
Weather Change orders due to inclement weather 
 
 Several factors identified in the literature review were not included in either the 
final change order causal factor list or the watch list.  Although construction deficiencies 
were frequently identified in the literature, they were not included because they represent 
work that did not meet the specifications of the contract and therefore are the 
responsibility of the contractor.  The factors of management problems, economic 
conditions, materials issues, safety/labor issues, bid dispersion, and project complexity 
were not included because the ACES data typically did not contain enough detail to 
attribute a change order to one of these causes.  Other factors that were not included were 
Table 3.  Defined change order causal factors observed in literature 
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project size and project length.  Project sizes were not recorded in consistent units within 
the database and could not be converted to a common unit; for example, a number of 
projects were recorded as “1 each” as opposed to square feet or square meters.  Project 
length data was lost as a result of the way in which data was collected from the ACES 
database.  The final variable identified in the literature that remains unaccounted for is 
location.  Although location information was included within the ACES data, the large 
number of unique bases made studying location by base infeasible.  Therefore, location 
was investigated by MAJCOM. 
 
Categorization of Data 
The 3,842 change orders retrieved from the ACES data were imported into an Excel 
spreadsheet and categorized according to the change order causal factor list shown in 
Table 2.  During this process, all data fields in the ACES data were masked except for the 
change order description.  Additionally, the protocol outlined in Chapter 3 was used to 
attribute a cause to each change order.  During the categorization process, the watch list 
of factors not identified in phase one was generated; this list is shown in Table 4.  The 
results of the categorization process are show in Table 5. 
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Causal Factor Definition 
Value Engineering Proposals 
Proposals made by the contract to 
decrease the cost of the project through 
the use of smart construction materials 
and techniques 
Exercised Options 
Options built into and negotiated as part 
of the initial contract and awarded at a 
later date as a change order 
Scope deletion Change orders removing scope from a project 
 
 
 
Change Order Causal Factor # of Change Orders 
Unforeseen Site Conditions 147 
Unforeseen Environmental Site Conditions 82 
User Change Requests 727 
Value Engineering Proposals 11 
Design Deficiencies 1573 
Unknown Causes 810 
Weather 235 
Exercised Option 35 
Scope Deletion 222 
Total 3842 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Results of the categorization of data 
Table 4.  Change order watch list 
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Final Data Analysis 
 The final data analysis utilized the data categorized in phase three to characterize 
change orders within the Air Force and draw conclusions about their causes.  The results 
are presented in two parts.  The first part characterizes the data collected and the second 
presents a statistical analysis of causal factors. 
Characterization of ACES MILCON Data 
 This section presents a characterization of the categorized data, which consisted 
of the usable MILCON projects financially completed from 2000 through 2004 (provided 
they were entered into the ACES database).  Of the original 5,286 change orders, 495 
were excluded because they were not associated with MILCON projects and 949 did not 
contain enough information to be included in the study.  Of the remaining 3,842 change 
orders, an additional 810 lacked sufficient information in the change order description 
field and were attributed to an unknown cause.  An additional data point was deleted 
from the analysis because it occurred as the result of an extraordinary circumstance that 
served as an accounting correction within the government contracting system and not as a 
change order.  Therefore, there were 3,031 change orders included in the analysis, which 
means that 37% or (1 – 3031/4791) of the ACES MILCON data was of insufficient 
quality to be included in this effort.  The data is spread across the entire geography of the 
Air Force and encompasses every MAJCOM as shown in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1.  Change Order Distribution by Major Command 
 
The Army Corps of Engineers (COE) administered the construction of 73% of the 
projects for the change orders analyzed, while the Naval Facilities Command and Air 
Force administered the construction on 12% and 15% of the projects, respectively.  By 
US Code (Title 10, Subtitle A,  Part IV,  Chapter 169, Subchapter III, § 2851), DoD 
Instruction (4270.5, sec 4.3.3.1), and the Air Force Military Construction Program 
Management Plan (sec 3.3b); the Air Force can act as construction agent for up to 5% of 
the total value of the MILCON program for a given fiscal year.  Prior to 2003, this was 
not possible.  Based on anecdotal evidence, it is highly suspect that the Air Force truly 
executed 15% of the MILCON projects within the dataset.  This is likely more 
representative of erroneous entries in the database.   
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The categorization of the data is shown in Table 6.  Speaking in a strictly 
descriptive sense, exercised options averaged as the most expensive change orders, 
costing $200,000 each and were also the most time consuming, causing an average delay 
of 18 days per change order.  Weather events (excluding disasters) caused the second 
most delay at an average of 17 days per change order but cost, on the average, the least at 
$1,700 each.  There were 11 value engineering change orders that averaged $56,000 in 
savings per change.  Finally, the remaining factors conservatively averaged $25,000 in 
cost and 6 days of delay per change 
When considering the tabulated results in Table 6, it was clear that not all the data 
could be compared as planned.  First, 810 samples that were attributed to unknown 
causes were excluded from analysis.  While they serve as a metric of the ACES data 
system, they do not yield useful information about the nature of change orders.  Second, 
there was an insufficient number of samples attributed to value engineering to make valid 
comparisons to the other causal factors.  Finally, the scope deletion and exercised options 
categories posed a significant problem.  While both may represent change order causes 
on paper, they may also be considered coping behaviors.  Project managers in the Air 
Force use scope deletion to accommodate for projects that are outstripping budget 
constraints and use exercised options to absorb excess contingency.  These causes of 
change orders are entirely within the project manager’s control.  The remaining five 
causal factors (unforeseen site conditions, unforeseen environmental site conditions, user 
change requests, design deficiencies, and weather) all represent causal factors beyond the 
control of the project manager.     
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Change Order Causal 
Factor 
# of 
Changes Cost ($) per Factor  
Delay 
(days) 
per 
Factor 
Unforeseen Site 
Conditions 147 $3,293,927  859 
Unforeseen Environmental 
Site Conditions 82 $2,239,376  569 
User Change Requests 727 $17,689,511  3759 
Value Engineering 
Proposals 11  -$620,228 0 
Design Deficiencies 1573 $39,382,507  7478 
Unknown Causes 810 $24,245,281  4690 
Weather 235 $392.670  4054 
Exercised Bid Option 35 $6,810,601  626 
Scope Deletion 222  -$5,582,969 408 
Total 3842 $94,053,873 -$6,203,197 22,443 
 
 
Statistical Analysis of ACES MILCON Data 
 The methodology outlined in Chapter 3 was implemented using a combination of 
the software tools JMP® and Excel®.  The statistical tests were applied to the data on the 
basis of the change order causal factor, MAJCOM, construction agent (the organization 
who managed the actual construction), and year of completion.  In each case, the 
dependent variable consisted of the standardized cost of each change order, which is the 
change order cost presented as a percentage of the total project cost.  Each group of 
statistical tests is presented in three sections:  the hypothesis, the results of the Kruskal-
Wallis (KW) test, and the results of the Dunn ranking technique (if applicable).  
Table 6.  Change Order Tabulation by Causal Factor 
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Verifications of relevant assumptions are documented in the appendix.  The error rate (α) 
is 0.05 for all tests. 
Analysis of ACES MILCON Data by Change Order Causal Factor 
The causal factors of Unforeseen Site Conditions, Unforeseen Environmental Site 
Conditions, User Change Requests, Design Deficiencies, and Weather were compared 
using the KW test; verification of the relevant assumptions is provided in Appendix A.  
The null hypothesis states that the medians of the population of each causal factor are 
equal; in other words,  kH θθθ === ...: 210 .  The alternate hypothesis is that at least two 
of the medians of the population of each causal factor are different where 1H : Not 0H .  
The test statistic was calculated as 8199.430=CH .  From the Chi-Square distribution 
table (Sheskin, 2007), 49.92950. =χ  with a p-value < 0.0001.  Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is rejected, which means that at least two of the change order causal factors 
have different median values of their populations.  The Dunn test was performed and the 
results indicated that the median values for Unforeseen Site Conditions, Unforeseen 
Environmental Site Conditions, User Changes, and Design Deficiencies were higher than 
Weather.  The only other significant difference was that Unforeseen Site Conditions had a 
greater impact than User Changes. 
These results did not provide the fidelity that had been hoped for.  Probable 
reasons for the lack of fidelity are discussed in the limitations section of Chapter 5.  
However, it is clear that weather has the lowest impact on projects.  The other four 
categories can in some way be attributed to pre-construction activities.  Site conditions, 
user changes, and design deficiencies are causes that can be addressed through increased 
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vigilance during pre-construction activities.  Therefore, the design process appears to 
show room for improvement.  This is not unexpected and coincides with much of 
published literature on the subject as reported in Chapter 2. 
Analysis of ACES MILCON Data by Major Command (MAJCOM) 
The major commands were also compared using the KW test; verification of the 
relevant assumptions is provided in Appendix A.  The null hypothesis states that the 
medians of the population of each causal factor are equal, kH θθθ === ...: 210 .  The 
alternate hypothesis is that at least two of the medians of the population of each causal 
factor are different, 1H : Not 0H .  The test statistic was calculated as 2876.61=CH .  
From the Chi-Square distribution table (Sheskin, 2007), 51.152950. =χ  with a p-value < 
0.0001.  The null hypothesis is thus rejected, indicating that at least two MAJCOMs have 
different median values of their populations.  The Dunn test was performed and the 
results are presented in Figure 2.  The conservative nature of the KW test and subsequent 
Dunn test ranking did not allow for more specific results, which are shown in Figure 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 USAFE, AFMC, PAF, and AFRC are not ranked, the results of the test could not 
conclusively show any cost difference in the median change order cost between those 
Figure 2.  Dunn Test Results – MAJCOM Rankings 
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commands. Figure 2 shows that the median cost of change orders in USAFE was higher 
than the median cost of change orders in AFSOC, AFSPACE, AMC, AETC, and ACC; 
the median cost of change orders in AFMC was higher than the median cost of change 
orders in AMC, AETC and ACC; the median cost of change orders in PAF was higher 
than the median cost of change orders in AETC and ACC; and finally the median cost of 
change orders in AFRC was higher than the median cost of change orders in ACC.  No 
ranking of the commands on the right side of the table with one another can be implied 
(for instance within USAFE, AFSOC is not greater than AFSPACE).  Of the commands 
with high medians, AFMC stands out.  USAFE and PAF both execute projects overseas 
and the data sample for AFRC was very small.  While not conclusive, there is some 
evidence to indicate that AFMC experienced more financial impact from change orders 
than other commands.  Interestingly, while the results on the right side of Figure 2 are not 
presented in rank order, it is notable that ACC was the only command that had a lower 
median than USAFE, AFRC, AFMC, and PAF.  ACC showed a strikingly greater mean 
difference when compared to the other commands (see Appendix C).  The results are not 
conclusive; however, evidence suggests that ACC may have lower cost impact from 
change orders as opposed to other commands. 
Analysis of ACES MILCON Data by Construction Agent. 
The construction agents (Army Corps of Engineers, Naval Facilities Command, 
and the Air Force) were also compared using the KW test; verification of assumptions is 
provided in Appendix A.  As with the previous tests, the null hypothesis states that the 
medians of the population of each causal factor are equal, kH θθθ === ...: 210 .  The 
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alternate hypothesis is that at least two of the medians of the population of each causal 
factor are different, 1H : Not 0H .  The test statistic was calculated as 7245.13=CH .  
From the Chi-Square distribution table (Sheskin, 2007), 99.52950. =χ  with a p-value < 
0.001.  The null hypothesis is thus rejected, which means that at least two construction 
agents have different median values for their populations.  The Dunn test was performed 
and the median of the change order costs as a percentage of total project cost was higher 
for the Air Force than both the Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities 
Command.  This test is very suspect and is not considered to be valid because of the 
probable error discussed earlier regarding the dataset and the construction agent field.  
However, this test does reveal that 15% of the projects, by a fairly wide margin, had 
change order medians that did in fact exceed the median costs of the other two groups.   
Analysis of ACES MILCON Data by Year 
 For the final analysis, the years of 2000 through 2004 were compared using the 
KW; verification of assumptions is provided in Appendix A.  The null hypothesis states 
that the medians of the population of each causal factor are equal, kH θθθ === ...: 210    
The alternate hypothesis is that at least two of the medians of the population of each 
causal factor are different, 1H : Not 0H .  The test statistic was calculated as 
2240.19=CH .  From the Chi-Square distribution table (Sheskin, 2007), 49.92950. =χ  with 
a p-value < 0.0007.  The null hypothesis is thus rejected, indicating that at least two years 
had statistically different medians.  The Dunn test revealed that the year 2004 had a 
higher median than all other years.  However, the small sample size in relative 
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comparison to the other years makes this result somewhat suspect.  Given the amount of 
suspect error in the dataset, it is likely that additional project data from 2004 would yield 
a different result. 
 
Conclusion 
 Data collection was plagued by a low response rate and poor quality.  When 
statistical analysis was applied, some useful descriptive characteristics of the population 
were tabulated.  When the data were tested using the KW test, statistical differences were 
found; however, due to the low quality of the data, the differences could not be 
definitively ranked in most cases.  The analysis does, however, suggest several courses 
for further investigation.  The results and potential uses of the results are discussed 
further in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5.  Conclusion 
 
 This chapter concludes the research effort with a discussion of the results, an 
overview of limitations that affected the work, recommendations to Air Force project 
managers (PMs), and some suggestions for future research. 
 
Discussion of Results 
 The most profound result of this effort is the spotlight placed on the typical Air 
Force civil engineer’s ability to capture and retain Military Construction (MILCON) 
project information for future use.  The response rate to the initial request for project data 
was only 15.5% (31 of 200 projects).  However, nearly half of the received project 
documents were in hardcopy form (15 of 31), which would seem to indicate that 
electronic documentation was not available.  It was also noteworthy that PMs did not 
appear to have a standardized list of project information they maintain. 
 While the PMs at Air Education and Training Command, Pacific Air Forces, and 
Air Force Special Operations Command were responsive, other project managers either 
overlooked the data request or were unable to provide the data.  In the case of one major 
command, project managers stated that they did not keep the requested records.  Others 
claimed the Army Corps of Engineers could not provide the data without additional 
funding, thereby implying that they did not maintain the records themselves either.  The 
use of data from the Automated Civil Engineer System (ACES) in place of the data 
sought in the initial request led to the discovery of more data housekeeping issues.  When 
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the ACES system was reviewed, 37% of the data was either nonexistent or of such poor 
quality that the specific change order could not be attributed to a cause. 
 The analysis of change order causal factors lacked enough fidelity to meet the 
original research goal, which was to provide PMs with a definitive rank ordered list of 
change order causal factors.  It is clear that the most prevalent change causes are changes 
due to pre-construction activities.  Four of the change order causes (unforeseen site 
conditions, unforeseen environmental site conditions, design deficiencies, and user 
change requests) can be attributed in some manner and in varying levels to pre-
construction activities.  Coupled with Cook’s (2006) work showing contingency budgets 
are roughly half of what they should be, this seems to indicate there are systemic 
problems in the Air Force design process. 
 Among the various major commands, there is some evidence to indicate that Air 
Force Material Command has potentially higher median change order costs than its 
stateside peers; by the same token, Air Combat Command seemed to have the lower 
median change order costs.  When considering the construction agent, the Air Force 
seems to have higher median change order costs than both the Army Corps of Engineers 
and the Naval Facilities Command.  However, no specific reasons can be attributed to 
these observations.    
 Given the accuracy and completeness of the data, these results remain 
questionable.  The methodology provided no means of checking for errors within the 
ACES data.  For example, according to the data, 15% of the 278 MILCON projects were 
managed by the Air Force.  While evidence is not presented as part of this effort, this 
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statistic seems unreasonably high based on anecdotal experience and suggests that the 
data is not accurately and/or consistently entered into ACES.  Unfortunately, the quality 
of the ACES data adversely impacts the results and is a severe limitation. 
 
Limitations 
 This research effort was primarily limited by the quality of the data, which was 
considered strongly suspect for a number of reasons.  Of the original 5,286 change 
orders, 495 were excluded because they were incorrectly associated with MILCON 
projects, 949 did not contain enough information to be included in the study, and 810 
lacked sufficient information in the change order description field.  In summary, 37% of 
the ACES MILCON data was of insufficient quality to be included.  The methodology 
was not designed, nor did it provide for, error checking of the ACES data.  The quality of 
the data thus led to the use of the conservative Kruskal-Wallis test for the statistical 
analysis.  Utilizing contractual documents would have yielded results of higher fidelity 
and quality; it would have also greatly minimized the occurrences of errors.  Higher 
quality data would perhaps have allowed the use of different testing techniques that 
would have provided higher fidelity within the results.   
 Even with perfect data though, a cause still had to be subjectively attributed to 
each change order.  Within database systems such as ACES, and to a lesser extent even 
the contract documents, there is not a standardized way of reporting the cause of a change 
order.  Therefore, the data is subject to some degree of bias from the researcher.  The 
change order description field often contains a single, short sentence that must be used to 
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attribute the change to a cause.  Twenty-one percent of the change orders with 
descriptions were excluded because they could not be attributed to a cause. 
 These results clearly demonstrate that the Air Force does not have an effective 
means of capturing and recalling project data on change orders.  As noted in the 
Barrientez study (1995), the Navy uses a standardized set of change order causes in their 
method of project documentation.  The Air Force should perhaps investigate the 
possibility of incorporating a similar standardized reporting system within ACES. 
 
Recommendations 
This research has generated two primary recommendations for Air Force 
MILCON project managers.  First, pre-construction activities seem to contribute the most 
to cost overruns as the result of change orders.  Therefore, project managers should take a 
careful look at how their design review processes are accomplished.  Any means by 
which the process can be strengthened can only improve project performance.  Second, 
the results of this research indicate that historical project information is not easily 
accessible (or even available) and is generally of poor quality.  However, without 
historical information, it is difficult to identify where past mistakes were made.  
Therefore, it is imperative that base-level PMs be educated on the importance of tracking 
historical data and the insight it can provide. 
On a broader scale, the major command program managers and Air Force 
leadership should consider some type of management plan for historical project 
information that makes it easily accessible.  Presently, the information that is contained in 
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the ACES database is relatively inaccessible to the local PM by the complicated nature of 
the report retrieval software.  If local PMs found the ACES system more useful in their 
day-to-day jobs, there would be more incentive to input and maintain the accuracy of the 
data, thereby benefiting both parties. 
 
Future Research 
 This effort has generated a number of interesting potential lines of investigation.   
Were this study to be repeated, perhaps a better strategy would be to select a 
representative sample of bases and analyze MILCON work at each base 
comprehensively.  It is clear that the cost overrun data that is presently available is of 
inadequate quality to definitively identify any causal trends. 
Among the major commands, Air Combat Command seems to have a lower 
median change order cost compared with the other commands.  What is Air Combat 
Command doing differently that other commands when it comes to the management of 
MILCON projects?  By the same token, why does Air Force Material Command seem to 
have higher median change order costs? 
What are the systematic problems within the Air Force design process?  It seems 
clear that the design process and other pre-construction activities can be improved to 
some degree.  Where is the process weak and what are the best strategies to strengthen it?  
Closely associated with these processes, project management training and processes 
could prove valuable, particularly by focusing on pre-construction activities. 
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Additionally, research considering the type and level of cost management most 
appropriate to the Air Force would be beneficial.  What type of historical project 
information is used by the private sector and are similar methods applicable to the Air 
Force?  What changes could be made to the ACES system to increase the quality of the 
data it captures?  This effort has made it clear that the Air Force is underutilizing a large 
pool of potentially valuable data.  How can the Air Force tap this resource and effectively 
exploit the data to improve project performance? 
 Finally, the data used by the present effort is somewhat obsolete, focusing on 
projects from 2000 to 2004.  With each passing year, more data becomes available.  
Future efforts aimed at improving the methodology used in this research and focusing on 
the intricacies of ACES data should yield better results with higher fidelity. 
 
Conclusion 
 This research represents a snapshot in time from 2000 to 2004.  It is subject to the 
weaknesses of the limitations of the available data.  Therefore, very conservative 
statistical testing was used to analyze the data.  The results indicate that pre-construction 
activities (unforeseen site conditions, unforeseen environmental site conditions, user 
changes, and design deficiencies) are the major contributors to cost overrun on MILCON 
projects, which is further supported by other research reported in the literature.  
Consequently, the Air Force should focus improvement efforts on pre-construction 
activities (i.e., the design and design review processes). 
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Appendix A. 
Analysis of ACES MILCON Data by CO Causal Factor 
a) The data has been randomly selected from the population  
 
 The data consists of the entire useable population of the data 
 
b) The data is independent  
 
Typically change orders on one project do not affect another.  Additionally, the 
change orders within a project are not typically dependent upon one another.   
 
c) The dependant variable is continuous  
 
 Change order cost is a continuous variable 
  
d) The underlying distributions from which the samples are derived are identical in shape. 
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Analysis of ACES MILCON Data by Major Command (MAJCOM) 
a) The data has been randomly selected from the population  
 
 The data consists of the entire useable population of the data 
 
b) The data is independent  
 
Typically change orders on one project do not affect another.  Additionally, the 
change orders within a project are not typically dependent upon one another.   
 
c) The dependant variable is continuous  
 
 Change order cost is a continuous variable 
  
d) The underlying distributions from which the samples are derived are identical in shape. 
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Distribution of United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) 
 67
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1314
100.0%
99.5%
97.5%
90.0%
75.0%
50.0%
25.0%
10.0%
2.5%
0.5%
0.0%
maximum
quartile
median
quartile
minimum
13.67
12.43
3.52
0.81
0.30
0.09591
0.03022
0.00
-0.0531
-0.83
-1.45
Quantiles
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
upper 95% Mean
lower 95% Mean
N
0.4145443
1.2638198
0.0729667
0.5581376
0.270951
300
Moments
 
Distribution of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) 
Distribution of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
100.0%
99.5%
97.5%
90.0%
75.0%
50.0%
25.0%
10.0%
2.5%
0.5%
0.0%
maximum
quartile
median
quartile
minimum
6.840
5.940
2.441
0.751
0.263
0.096
0.028
0.00565
-0.161
-0.748
-0.872
Quantiles
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
upper 95% Mean
lower 95% Mean
N
0.3085845
0.7429431
0.0410848
0.3894094
0.2277596
327
Moments
Distribution of Air Mobility Command (AMC) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4
100.0%
99.5%
97.5%
90.0%
75.0%
50.0%
25.0%
10.0%
2.5%
0.5%
0.0%
maximum
quartile
median
quartile
minimum
3.808
3.504
2.175
0.813
0.325
0.101
0.022
0.000
-0.167
-0.645
-0.961
Quantiles
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
upper 95% Mean
lower 95% Mean
N
0.3033024
0.5839619
0.0259603
0.3543059
0.252299
506
Moments
 68
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution of Pacific Air Forces (PAF) 
0 1 2 3 4
100.0%
99.5%
97.5%
90.0%
75.0%
50.0%
25.0%
10.0%
2.5%
0.5%
0.0%
maximum
quartile
median
quartile
minimum
4.712
4.712
3.010
1.278
0.337
0.143
0.051
0.000
-0.209
-0.656
-0.656
Quantiles
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
upper 95% Mean
lower 95% Mean
N
0.4184923
0.795228
0.0647147
0.5463625
0.2906221
151
Moments
 
 69
Analysis of ACES MILCON Data by Construction Agent  
a) The data has been randomly selected from the population  
 
 The data consists of the entire useable population of the data 
 
b) The data is independent  
 
Typically change orders on one project do not affect another.  Additionally, the 
change orders within a project are not typically dependent upon one another.   
 
c) The dependant variable is continuous  
 
 Change order cost is a continuous variable 
  
d) The underlying distributions from which the samples are derived are identical in shape. 
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Distribution of Air Force Managed Projects (AF) 
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Analysis of ACES MILCON Data by Year  
a) The data has been randomly selected from the population  
 
 The data consists of the entire useable population of the data 
 
b) The data is independent  
 
Typically change orders on one project do not affect another.  Additionally, the 
change orders within a project are not typically dependent upon one another.   
 
c) The dependant variable is continuous  
 
 Change order cost is a continuous variable 
  
d) The underlying distributions from which the samples are derived are identical in shape. 
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Appendix B. 
 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Test Results by Change Order Causal Factors 
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Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Test Results by Major Command (MAJCOM) 
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Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Test Results by Construction Agent 
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Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Test Results by Year 
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Appendix C. 
 
Dunn Test Results - Change Order Causal Factors 
 
 
N Rank Sum Rank Mean
Env. Site Cond. 82 132227.5 1612.53049
Site Cond. 147 236925 1611.73469
Design Def. 1573 2341493 1488.55245
User Change 727 1025038.5 1409.95667
Weather 235 85546 364.025532
N 2764
α 0.05
# of comparisons - c 10
α/c 0.005
zadj 2.5758
Mean Diff Req Diff
Env. Site Cond. Site Cond. 0.7958 283.3317
Env. Site Cond. Design Def. 123.9780 232.8471
Env. Site Cond. User Change 202.5738 239.4656
Env. Site Cond. Weather 1248.5050 263.6525 TRUE
Site Cond. Design Def. 123.1822 177.2900
Site Cond. User Change 201.7780 185.8972 TRUE
Site Cond. Weather 1247.7092 216.1634 TRUE
Design Def. User Change 78.5958 92.1882
Design Def. Weather 1124.5269 143.7620 TRUE
User Change Weather 1045.9311 154.2515 TRUE
Comparison
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Dunn Test Results - Major Command (MAJCOM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N Rank Sum Rank Mean
USAFE 67 113799 1698.493
AFRC 27 44401.5 1644.5
AFMC 284 419234.5 1476.178
PAF 151 219754.5 1455.328
AFSOC 300 397248.5 1324.162
AMC 506 661624.5 1307.558
AFSPC 327 424930.5 1299.482
AETC 640 785473.5 1227.302
ACC 321 374909.5 1167.942
N 2623
α 0.05
# of comparisons - c 36
α/c 0.0014
zadj 2.9913
Mean Diff Req Diff
USAFE AFRC 53.9925 516.4133
USAFE AFMC 222.3147 307.6874
USAFE PAF 243.1647 332.5486
USAFE AFSOC 374.3309 306.1172 TRUE
USAFE AMC 390.9342 294.5218 TRUE
USAFE AFSPC 399.0109 303.8013 TRUE
USAFE AETC 471.1902 290.8942 TRUE
USAFE ACC 530.5502 304.2837 TRUE
AFRC AFMC 168.3222 456.2385
AFRC PAF 189.1722 473.3609
AFRC AFSOC 320.3383 455.1810
AFRC AMC 336.9417 447.4651
AFRC AFSPC 345.0184 453.6267
AFRC AETC 417.1977 445.0859
AFRC ACC 476.5576 453.9499 TRUE
AFMC PAF 20.8500 228.1654
AFMC AFSOC 152.0162 187.5596
AFMC AMC 168.6195 167.9701 TRUE
AFMC AFSPC 176.6962 183.7555
AFMC AETC 248.8755 161.5249 TRUE
AFMC ACC 308.2355 184.5520 TRUE
PAF AFSOC 131.1661 226.0434
PAF AMC 147.7695 210.0737
PAF AFSPC 155.8462 222.8971
PAF AETC 228.0255 204.9569 TRUE
PAF ACC 287.3854 223.5542 TRUE
AFSOC AMC 16.6034 165.0762
AFSOC AFSPC 24.6800 181.1140
AFSOC AETC 96.8593 158.5134
AFSOC ACC 156.2193 181.9221
AMC AFSPC 8.0766 160.7408
AMC AETC 80.2560 134.7658
AMC ACC 139.6159 161.6508
AFSPC AETC 72.1793 153.9934
AFSPC ACC 131.5393 177.9975
AETC ACC 59.3600 154.9430
Comparison
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Dunn Test Results - Construction Agent 
 
N Rank Sum Rank Mean
AF 395 598899 1516.2
COE 2046 2794707 1365.93695
NAVFC 323 427624 1323.91331
N 2764
α 0.05
# of comparisons - c 3
α/c 0.0167
zadj 2.1280
Mean Diff Req Diff
AF COE 150.2631 93.3339 TRUE
AF NAVFC 192.2867 127.3999 TRUE
COE NAVFC 42.0236 101.6799
Comparison
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Dunn Test Results – Year 
 
 
n Rank Sum Rank Mean
2004 52 95883 1843.90385
2003 179 252638 1411.38547
2000 639 883280 1382.28482
2002 1096 1514571.5 1381.9083
2001 798 1074857.5 1346.93922
N 2764
α 0.05
# of comparisons - c 10
α/c 0.005
zadj 2.5758293
Mean Diff Req Diff
2004 2003 432.51838 323.83 TRUE
2004 2000 461.61903 296.44 TRUE
2004 2002 461.99555 291.75 TRUE
2004 2001 496.96463 294.20 TRUE
2003 2000 29.10065 173.84
2003 2002 29.47717 165.72
2003 2001 64.44625 170.01
2000 2002 0.37652 102.31
2000 2001 35.3456 109.12
2002 2001 34.96908 95.66
Comparison
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